



INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
& TRAINING ON
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

EUROPA.S. 2023

European Council



EUROPA.S.

PROMOTING EXCELLENCE, POLITICAL INNOVATION AND
LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE

EUropa.S. 2023

7-10 April

University of Piraeus

Organized by:

Institute of Research &
Training on European
Affairs

STUDY GUIDE

Topic: Reviving the Idea of European Strategic Autonomy under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish aggression in the European Geopolitical Border

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Greeting of the Board..... | 3 |
| Introduction to European Council | 4 |
| Introduction to the Topic..... | 5 |
| Review of the Issue | 6 |
| EU Strategic Autonomy: Reconceptualizing Geopolitical Europe | 6 |
| Russian Invasion in Ukraine: Assessing the Situation | 8 |
| The Dynamics of EU-Türkiye Relations: Going Forward or Backwards? | 14 |
| Legal Framework..... | 15 |
| EU Response to the Russian Invasion in Ukraine | 17 |
| The EU Sanction Regime against Russia..... | 17 |
| EU Aid to Ukraine..... | 20 |
| Enhancing Military Mobility under the CSDP | 21 |
| Addressing the Goeconomic Impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Responding to the Energy and Food Crises | 22 |
| Turkish Aggression near the European Geopolitical Borders | 24 |
| Violations of Greek Airspace and Territorial Waters | 24 |
| Unauthorized Drilling Activities near Cyprus..... | 29 |
| Türkiye’s Migratory Pressure | 32 |
| EU Reaction towards Türkiye’s Assertive Military and Foreign Policy | 34 |
| Conclusions | 35 |
| Questions Raised | 36 |
| Bibliography..... | 37 |
| Further Reading | 42 |
| Useful Links | 42 |

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Greeting of the Board

Distinguished Heads of States and Governments,

*It is our utmost pleasure to welcome you to EUropa.S 2023 and precisely to the European Council. As your board members, we will ensure that this is going to be an unforgettable experience for all of you, with passionate and productive debates of high academic quality, in an amicable and collaborative environment. During our sessions, you are called to tackle the demanding topic of **“Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the European Geopolitical Border”**.*

This Study Guide is advised to be used as a compass that indicates how to organize and conduct your research for the topic and assist you with your overall preparations. You should, however, bear in mind that the information that this Study Guide is going to provide you with, is only an overview of this complex and challenging topic area that covers the developments around the topic until the 31st of December 2022. Therefore, we strongly encourage you to expand your personal research both on the topic and on your country’s position.

We are certain that you will provide us with structured, well-written position papers, constructive debates and concrete solutions. We do anticipate delegates to be respectful, devoted, and eager to make the most out of their experience, but most importantly, we want you to enjoy yourselves and share our passion and love for debate. During your whole experience, we will be at your disposal for any possible remarks and inquiries that may arise. If this experience is a game of strategy, negotiation, cooperation and preparation, we are ready to give you all the necessary instructions and inspire you for your next steps.

It goes without saying that we cannot wait to meet you all in April, but, until then, we hope you enjoy your research experience as much as we did!

*Kind regards,
The Board of the European Council*

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Introduction to European Council

Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council (EC) represents the highest level of political cooperation between EU countries. It sets the EU's policy agenda by defining its general political direction and priorities. However, it is not a legislative institution, therefore it does not negotiate or adopt EU laws.

Furthermore, it adopts conclusions which become public after every meeting of the EC. The purposes of the conclusions are the identification of specific issues of concern for the EU and the outline of actions or goals necessary for each issue. It decides upon the conclusions with consensus apart from the cases that the Treaties state otherwise and only the heads of state or government have the right to vote.

The EC consists of the heads of state or government of the EU member states, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission. When the agenda of the EC concerns issues of foreign policy, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also participates. The President of the EC is elected by the heads of state or government for a once renewable two-and-a-half-year term. The President, presides over the EC's meetings with the aim of facilitating cohesion and consensus among the member states during its proceedings, represents the EU to the international arena, ensures in cooperation with the President of the Commission, the preparation of European Council meetings and the continuity of their work and informs the European Parliament after every meeting of the EC.¹

¹ European Council, *How the European Council Works*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/how-the-european-council-works/>
[Accessed: 20/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Introduction to the Topic

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full scaled invasion of Ukraine creating an unprecedented crisis in the European continent and breaking the post-Cold War European security order. Russia’s aggression called for Europe to re-evaluate responses to crises and capacity building. It was evident that the EU needs to find ways to better protect its European citizens. Given the more hostile security environment, the EU must address new challenges and set a common vision for all member states.

The Strategic Compass document aims to identify those challenges and enhance the Union’s ability to act when facing external threats. HR/VP Josep Borrell in November 2021 introduced the first draft for the Strategic Compass in front of defence ministers and later in March 2022, the Council decided to formally approve the document. The four main pillars of the Strategic Compass are to act, invest, secure and partner. The Compass envisions a stronger and more capable Union in the security and defence sector, that will also contribute to the international and transatlantic security while being complementary to NATO.

A new strategic approach is necessary for the EU when facing geopolitical threats. Besides the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the EU struggles to find a solution in the negotiations with Türkiye as conflicting interests arise each time the Council converses. Maritime boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Türkiye on the one side and between Cyprus and Türkiye on the other, are at the root of the issue. Türkiye wishes to have a share in the energy exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean Furthermore, Ankara’s coercive foreign policy cannot be met with a tough response as Türkiye is a NATO ally. Ankara of course is taking advantage of this asymmetry by continuing and expanding its assertiveness in the region.²

² Dalay, G. (2021), *Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock*, Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-europe-and-the-eastern-mediterranean-charting-a-way-out-of-the-current-deadlock/>
[Accessed: 25/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Review of the Issue

EU Strategic Autonomy: Reconceptualizing Geopolitical Europe

In December 2003, Javier Solana submitted to the European Council the first strategic document of the EU called ‘*A secure Europe in a better world*’. For the first time it set strategic objectives and identified global challenges that the EU would have to address in the international arena in the globalization age. It acknowledged the progress of the Union until then and the growth of the European Security and Defence Policy. However, it also highlighted the need to improve and lead the way towards a renewal of the multilateral order.³

In June 2016, HR/VP Federica Mogherini introduced the second strategic document titled ‘*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*’.⁴ According to the Global Strategy, principled pragmatism is the theory guiding the Union’s external action while managing the opportunities and challenges of interdependence in a wider world. Responsibility would be at the core of EU principles when pursuing new goals and working with like-minded partners. The five priorities of external action would be the following: a) the security of the Union, b) state and societal resilience to the East and South, c) an integrated approach to conflicts, d) cooperative regional orders, and e) global governance for the 21st century. Strategic autonomy is referred to as the ability of the Union to decide autonomously and have the means to act accordingly. EU Strategic autonomy is translated as serving vital interests such as: peace and security on European territory, people’s prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based order.⁵

In the latest document titled ‘*A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*’, an ambitious plan is set in order to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030. The Compass assesses the new strategic

³ European Council (2003), *A secure Europe in a better world*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/> [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

⁴ EEAS (2016), *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

⁵ Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D. & Tsakonias, P. (2019), *Eksoterikes Sxeseis tis EE* (Foreign Relations of the EU), I. Sideris Publications, Athens

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

environment in which the EU operates and identifies the renewed threats and challenges following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Borrell specifically mentions that the war has made it more urgent for a ‘sea change in EU security and defence’. The Union will also become a stronger transatlantic partner with security interests in regions including but not limited to the Western Balkans, the Sahel, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.⁶

Firstly, the EU must support Ukraine and its citizens. An opening ought to be maintained in order for Russia to hopefully return to dialogue and reason with peace being the main purpose. Secondly, it is a crucial strategic imperative that the Union reduces its energy dependence on imports from authoritarian states. The green-energy transition and renewables are priorities for the EU. Thirdly, the EU should develop the means to defend its citizens in the world of power politics without having to restrict itself with economic tools.⁷

The Strategic Compass as mentioned previously enhances the Union’s ability to **act, secure, invest** and **partner**. The EU will act by creating an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops, by deploying 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days if needed, by conducting regular live exercises on land and at sea, and by enhancing military mobility. Also, the Compass will promote a more flexible decision-making process in civilian and military CSDP missions.

Furthermore, in order to safeguard the Union’s security interest, the EU will develop Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams to tackle hybrid threats. Additionally, it will develop the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and establish a Cyber Defence Policy. In the same context, it will establish a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox and create an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence while enhancing its role as a maritime security actor.

⁶ European Council (2022), *A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/> [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

⁷ Josep Borrell (2022), *Putin’s War has given birth to Geopolitical Europe*, Project Syndicate. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/geopolitical-europe-responds-to-russias-war-by-josep-borrell-2022-03> [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

The EU will further invest on defence technological innovation aiming to become more autonomous. According to the new document, the Union will provide more incentives for member states to jointly invest in next generation capabilities on land, sea, air, in cyberspace and in outer space.

Lastly, the EU will address common threats through cooperation with strategic partners such as the UN, NATO and other partners in the region (e.g. OSCE, AU, ASEAN). Partnerships will extend on a deeper level with like-minded countries such as Canada, Norway, the UK, the US and Japan. The EU will in fact promote and support CSDP operations in the Western Balkans, the eastern and southern neighborhood, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Russian Invasion in Ukraine: Assessing the Situation

The two breakaway provinces Luhansk and Donetsk are the center of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. On **21 February**, President Vladimir Putin recognised the independence of the two areas in the Donbas region, that are controlled mostly by Russian-backed separatists.⁸ Following that, Russian troops started entering the area escalating the conflict to what seemed to become a prelude for a greater invasion. On the next day, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel and the President of the

⁸ New York Times, *Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html> [Accessed 15/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen denounced the decision as ‘illegal and unacceptable’.



Figure 1: Areas Controlled by Russian-backed separatists (source: [Bloomberg](#))

On **24 February** Russia launches the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by land, sea and air. Putin orders the shelling of many towns and cities with intense fighting erupting outside the capital Kyiv and Kharkiv.

The attacks sounded all the alarms and hundreds of thousands of refugees began fleeing towards EU countries like Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland.



Figure 2: Areas of Reported Attacks (source: [Bloomberg](#))

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

On 28 February, Ukraine officially applied for EU membership to what was a historical moment for the country.

In **March** it was evident that Putin’s strategy to surprise Ukraine and capture the capital via the use of military power had failed.⁹ However, Russian forces managed to reach other cities with military-strategic importance. They surrounded and bombarded Mariupol and fully seized the Black Sea port of Kherson. The city of Kharkiv was also a site of continuous bombardment.¹⁰

In Bucha, evidence of war crimes emerged as hundreds of dead bodies of civilians were found. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy along with European leaders called it a genocide. The Prime Minister of Poland stated that Russia is a totalitarian-fascist state and that the bloody massacres by the Russian troops are clearly a case of genocide.¹¹

Also, Georgia and Moldova applied for EU membership as a response to Russian aggression near their borders.

Later, in the beginning of **April**, Europe witnessed a new phase of the war in Ukraine. Ukrainians reclaimed control of the towns around Kyiv and Chernihiv, as Russian troops retreated signing a turning point in the conflict. After withdrawing from northern Ukraine, Russia shifted its focus

⁹ Speck, U. (2022), *Putin unchained: Europe must turn Russia’s war against Ukraine into a failure*, Politico.eu. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-europe-russia-war-ukraine-failure/> [Accessed: 10/11/2022]

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Askew, J. (2022), *Ukraine War: A month-by-month timeline of the conflict in 2022*, Euronews. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-europe-russia-war-ukraine-failure/> [Accessed 30/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”
 Study Guide

towards the eastern part of the country seizing the city of Izyum and pushing the fight near Sloviansk.




Figure 3: Ukrainian Counter Offensives [April 5, 2022] (Source: [ISW](#))

In **May**, Sweden and Finland revealed their intentions to join NATO after years of military non-alignment, sparking an urgent rethink in the two countries. Their shift faced opposition, though, from Türkiye and Hungary.

In the east, Russia made significant advances striving to surround Sievierodonetsk. Capturing Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk would give Russia full control of the Luhansk province.

Russia redeployed troops to focus more on a narrower target. According to the military analyst, H. Schlottman, numbers of Russia’s military personnel had grown significantly in the Donbas region. In **June**, Sievierodonetsk suffered an intense assault with the Russians steadily gaining ground.¹² On the other hand, Ukrainian troops retook Snake Island landing a big blow to Russia’s military prestige.

On 23 June, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. As for Georgia, the European Council would grant candidate status

¹² Ibid

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

once the priorities mentioned in the Commission's opinion were addressed.¹³

In **July**, the battle for the industrialised Donbas region continued with the Luhansk province falling to the Russian army. Ukrainian forces turned immediately to defend Donetsk which was the next target of Moscow.

In addition, Russia finally agrees to allow Ukrainian grain to be exported across the Black Sea, a move aimed at easing the global food crisis.

In southern Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian military forces have been clashing for months now near the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, states in **August** that the two sides must end the fighting in the area due to the fear of a great nuclear catastrophe.

In **September**, the Ukrainian military in a rapid counter offensive landed a huge victory in northeastern Ukraine, freeing the city of Izyum, previously occupied for months by the Russians. On 30 September, Putin announced the annexation of Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson and Donetsk, a move that violated international law.

In **October**, Russia began to heavily bomb Ukraine's energy infrastructure and civilian sites that provided heat and electricity leaving many citizens of the country without power. The missile attacks killed at least 11 people and were intended to weaken the national morale of Ukraine.

On 11 **November**, Russian forces evacuated Kherson, a key point in Russia's effort to control the coastline along the Black Sea. Kherson was one of the first cities to fall during the first days of the war.

Additionally, a blast near the borders of Ukraine led to the death of two people and urged Poland to raise its military readiness. Initially, there was some thought of invoking Article 4 of the Charter of NATO, which can be invoked when the integrity, political independence or security of any of the

¹³ European Council, *EU Enlargement Policy-Ukraine*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/> [Accessed: 20/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

members is threatened. However, it was later confirmed that the explosion was caused by a Ukrainian air defence missile.¹⁴



Figure 4: War Situation - November 2022 (source: [ISW](#))

According to the Institute for the Study of War, Ukraine reclaimed 54% of the land lost to Russia since the outbreak of the war.

In **December**, President Zelenskyy headed to the US in his first visit since the start of the war. In his speech he invoked Ukraine’s need for further military and financial assistance and was confident in the country’s ability to withstand further attacks from the Russian troops. In fact, Russia has suffered roughly until now 100,000 casualties.¹⁵

On the 31st of December, the Ukrainian military hit a devastating strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk. The attack has generated criticism

¹⁴ Tidey, A. (2022), Deadly Poland blast 'likely caused' by Ukrainian air defence system, NATO chief says, Euronews. Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/11/16/nato-chief-holds-emergency-meeting-over-poland-explosion> [Accessed: 05/12/2022]

¹⁵ Haltiwagner, J., Rojas, W. & Snodgrass, E. (2022), *Ukrainian President Zelenskyy delivered historic speech to Congress at a crucial moment in Ukraine war: 'Ukraine is alive'*, Business Insider. Available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/zelenskyy-gives-historic-speech-to-joint-session-of-congress-2022-12>

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

towards the leadership of the Russian military for lack of organization and coordination in the Russian information space.¹⁶

The Dynamics of EU-Türkiye Relations: Going Forward or Backwards?

The previous decades, the European Council expressed the European Union’s readiness to engage with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner to enhance cooperation in a number of areas of common interest but, in the past years, a series of sanctions have been imposed on Türkiye due to its continuous violations of not only but limited to human rights and EU member states sovereignty. Also, many EU states state that Türkiye no longer meets the democratic criteria to be a candidate, let alone an EU member.

Türkiye’s Accession process began in October 2005 and out of the 35 negotiation chapters, 16 have been opened since then, of which only one – Science and Research – has been provisionally closed, whilst today many remain blocked for political reasons. On June of 2018 the Council noted that “Türkiye has been moving further away from the European Union. Türkiye’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing”.¹⁷

Türkiye’s tensions with the neighbouring – EU member-states countries, and the unwillingness to comply with EU shared values and aggressive policy in the Eastern Mediterranean have led to a drastic turn in EU – Türkiye relations. Nevertheless, a promising candidate, a key strategic and economic partner and a country with important geostrategic depth has now been opposed to the European shared values and instead of moving towards a like-minded dialogue, it’s taking steps back.¹⁸ Lastly, the Report on

¹⁶ Barros, G. (2023), *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment*, ISW. Available at: <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2023> [Accessed: 02/01/2023]

¹⁷ Council of the European Union (2018), *Enlargement and stabilization and association process – Council conclusions*
Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf> [Accessed at: 23/12/2022]

¹⁸ Policy Department for External Relations Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, *Turkey’s foreign policy and its consequences for the EU*

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Türkiye published by the European Commission in 2022 didn't show promising signs of progress. Overall there has been a significant backslide in democracy while the independence of regulatory authorities and developing administrative capacity needs to be improved. In all areas considered, implementation and enforcement are key for further progress.¹⁹

Legal Framework

Article 49 Treaty of Lisbon

'Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 (respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights) and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements'.²⁰

Article 42 Treaty of Lisbon

'Article 42(7) TEU is the European Union's mutual assistance clause. Once activated by an attacked Member State, all other Member States have to provide assistance in response. The article thus guarantees solidarity amongst Member States in case of an armed aggression against any one of them. This assistance can, for example, range from diplomatic support and

Available at:

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/653662/EXPO_IDA\(2022\)653662_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/653662/EXPO_IDA(2022)653662_EN.pdf)
[Accesses at: 23/12/2022]

¹⁹ European Commission, Key Findings on of the 2022 Report on Türkiye. Available here:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_22_6088

²⁰ Article 49 (TEU). Available here: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-on-european-union-joining-the-eu.html>

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

technical or medical assistance to civilian or military aid, among others. Member States have regularly held table-top and scenario-based exercises on the activation and implementation of the mutual assistance clause. These exercises also cover hybrid scenarios or large-scale cyberattacks. Article 42(7) TEU is consistent with commitments under NATO, which is and will remain the foundation of collective defence for its members'.²¹

Article 10A Treaty of Lisbon

'The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional, or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations'.²²

Article 10B Treaty of Lisbon

'On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 10 A, the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States. The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. Decisions of the European Council shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties'.²³

²¹ Article 42 (TEU). Available here: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M042>

²² Article 10A (TEU). Available here: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>

²³ Ibid

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

[Article 188J §1 Treaty of Lisbon](#)

‘The Union's operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of the Union. Such operations shall be intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations. The Union's measures and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other.’²⁴

[Article 63 §1 Treaty of Lisbon](#)

‘The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties’.²⁵

EU Response to the Russian Invasion in Ukraine

[The EU Sanction Regime against Russia](#)

Sanctions are tools of the EU to promote the goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Their aim is to safeguard EU values, interests and security. Furthermore, they support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and consolidate the principles of international law.

The EU has imposed until December 2022, 9 packages of sanctions against Russia as a response to the military invasion Ukraine. EU Restrictive measures against Russia include sanctions against wealthy Russian individuals and economic sanctions in the sectors of finance, transport, energy, defence, raw materials, services and restrictions on media meaning the suspension of broadcasting activities of certain Russian outlets in the EU.

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Ibid

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

The **first package** of sanctions was announced on 23 February and included sanctions against the members of the Russian State Duma, economic restrictions on the relations with the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, and sanctions on Russia’s access to European capital and financial markets and services.²⁶

The **second package** targeted President Vladimir Putin and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov in addition to the members of the National Security Council. Sanctions on individuals consist of travel bans and asset freezes. Travel bans restrict the individuals from entering the EU and asset freezes in practise mean that all accounts in EU banks are frozen.²⁷

On 28 February, the EU approved a **third package** of sanctions which included bans on transactions with the Russian Central Bank, a ban on the overflight of EU airspace and a €500 million support package to finance equipment for the Ukrainian military forces. Also, the EU excluded seven Russian banks from SWIFT, thus harming their ability to operate in the international financial system.²⁸

The European Council approved a **fourth package** on 15 March introducing trade restrictions on iron, steel and luxury goods. The list of banned products aims to maximise the negative impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy. The initial impact is already visible has witnessed a sharp decline on imports to Russia of advanced technologies and equipment that is not easily replaced.²⁹

In a response to the continuous Russian crimes in Ukraine, the EU adopted a **fifth package** of sanctions introducing a ban on: a) imports of coal from Russia, b) Russian vessels accessing EU ports, c) Russian road transport

²⁶ European Council, *EU Restrictive Measures against Russia over Ukraine*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/> [Accessed 25/12/2022]

²⁷ European Council, *EU Sanctions against Russia explained*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/> [Accessed: 25/12/2022]

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Taran, S. (2022), *Strengthening the impact of EU sanctions against Russian aggression in Ukraine*, European Policy Centre. Available at: https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/Strengthening_the_impact_of_EU_sanctions_DP.pdf [Accessed: 25/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

operators from crossing EU borders, d) exports to Russia of jet fuel, e) deposits to crypto-wallets, and f) imports of other goods (wood, cement, seafood and liquor).³⁰

Later in June after the introduction of the Strategic Compass, the EU adopted a **sixth package** of sanctions including a ban on imports from Russia of crude oil and refined petroleum products, the extension to the SWIFT ban to an additional three Russian banks, and the suspension of broadcasting of Russian outlets in the EU.³¹

The next list of restrictive measures against Russia was called the **‘maintenance and alignment’ package** which intended to tighten existing economic measures. The package reinforces export controls of dual use goods and adds new sanctions on individuals and entities including the mayor of Moscow.³²

On 6 October, the EU adopted an **eighth package of sanctions**. The restrictions were extended to a price cap in the maritime transport of Russian oil for third countries, additional restrictions on trade and services and further sanctions on individuals. Three Iranian individuals and one Iranian entity were also sanctioned in view of their role in the development of UAVs for Russia’s use in the war. Later, a price cap at \$60 per barrel for crude oil and petroleum oils was agreed upon by the EU. The decision was designed to limit price surges due to unusual market conditions while reducing Russia’s earned revenues.

Finally, on 16 December, the European Council decided to adopt the **ninth package** of sanctions against Russia. The new list of measures intended mostly to ban exports of drone engines and investments in the mining sector.

In the EU Sanctions Regime on Russia, two different logics are combined. The traditional one that aims to weaken the economy and reduce the revenue available to keep up the war effort, and the selective logic that targets the elites in order to distance them from the regime. Sanctions in

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

³² Ibid

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

general are considered a slow tool, although time works in their favour and their effects are hard to reverse. Against Russia they have already made an impact by curtailing Moscow’s ability to wage war. According to the European Commission, Russia’s imports and exports are down by 20,8% and 12,3% respectively, while €20 billion in assets are frozen (December 2022).

The collective use of the sanctions has allowed the Union to present a unified stance and commitment to international norms, and therefore their role is not negligible.³³

EU Aid to Ukraine

Firstly, the EU has enhanced its measures in order to alleviate the pressure from neighbouring countries of Ukraine which are receiving incoming refugees. In March, the temporary protection directive was activated in order to protect and bolster the national asylum systems allowing displaced persons to enjoy rights such as residence, access to labour market, access to housing, social welfare assistance and medical assistance. The directive is an emergency mechanism that can be activated to assist displaced persons with immediate and collective protection.

Regarding humanitarian aid, the Union has granted €485 million to civilians fleeing the war in Ukraine and to citizens remaining in the country. The funding is allocated in order to ensure essential living conditions, food and water, healthcare etc.

It needs to be mentioned that the EU has also responded to the conflict by activating the EU civil protection mechanism which is in charge of coordinating the delivery of assistance to Ukraine and neighbouring states. The protection provided via the referred mechanism is worth €516 million. Material assistance includes medical supplies, power generators, shelter items, firefighting equipment and food and water pumps.

³³ Portela, C. & Kluge, J. (2022), *Slow-Acting Tools: Evaluating EU sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine*, EUISS. Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_11_Sanctions_0.pdf [Accessed: 30/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

In the field of macro-finance, the Council adopted a package that states that the EU will assist Ukraine financially throughout 2023 with €18 billion. In January the first tranche of €3 billion will be released. The package aims to provide macroeconomic stability in addition to the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and the support of Ukraine’s path towards European integration.

Enhancing Military Mobility under the CSDP

The EU has contributed €3,1 billion to the armed forces of Ukraine through the European Peace Facility until October 2022. The Union provides assistance to the Ukrainian forces in order to strengthen their capabilities and resilience.

The EU also established the **EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM)** in October 2022 and launched it in the next month. In December EU and Norway signed an agreement in support of the mission. The mission aims to enhance the capability of Ukraine’s armed forces in conducting military operations and to allow Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders while exercising its sovereignty and protecting civilians. Specifically, the mission will provide (a) training to Ukraine’s armed forces personnel at different levels, (b) specialised training, (c) training to the military reserve component of Ukraine’s armed forces (i.e., the Territorial Defence Forces), and (d) coordination for EU countries’ existing Ukraine-related military training efforts. The mission’s duration is two years and the cost will amount up to €106,700,000 million. The Mission Commander is the Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean.³⁴

In numbers, EUMAM will train around 15,000 Ukrainian troops in two years to boost the country’s ability to defend itself against Russia. According to officials, 12,000 Ukrainians will receive basic military training, while another 2,800 are set to receive specialised training through EUMAM. These initial target figures, as well as EUMAM’s deployment period, can be increased later if necessary.

³⁴ Council of the EU, *Ukraine: EU launches Military Assistance Mission*, Press Release. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/15/ukraine-eu-launches-military-assistance-mission/> [Accessed: 15/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Given the ongoing war, EUMAM will not operate in Ukraine itself but within the EU (i.e., in Germany and Poland) until the Council decides otherwise – representing an interesting “first” for land-based EU military operations, which have so far operated exclusively outside the Union. This is because Article 42(1) of the EU Treaty states that the Union may use military and civilian assets in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) “outside the Union”, not within it.

In practice, the Treaty requirement for CSDP operations and missions to operate “outside the Union” has been withering for several years. The former EU naval operation Sophia as well as IRINI, its ongoing successor, have operated within the territorial waters of EU countries (e.g., Greece, Italy, Malta) while fighting human smuggling and trafficking and enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya in the Mediterranean. This shows that CSDP can adapt to Europe’s evolving security environment.

However, training Ukraine’s armed forces will be a new kind of challenge for CSDP. Through EUMAM, the EU will provide military training to a country fighting an active war against a great power aggressor. This is something that the EU as an organisation has never done or experienced before. In the past, EU military training missions have provided training primarily to the armed forces of countries in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa that have been fighting terrorists and various types of militia groups. The stakes will be higher in EUMAM’s case.³⁵

Addressing the Geoeconomic Impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Responding to the Energy and Food Crises

Since Europe is heavily dependant on Russia’s energy supply it became vital for the EU to diversify its energy supply sources and routes. On 30-31 March of 2022, the European Council decided to ban on almost 90% of all Russian oil imports by the end of 2022 with the exception of crude oil delivered by pipeline. The EU member states called for accelerating the deployment of renewables, further improving energy efficiency and re-evaluating interconnections of gas and electricity networks.

³⁵ Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, *Within the new Ukraine Mission, EU Military Training Becomes More Geopolitical*. Available at: <https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/with-the-new-ukraine-mission-eu-military-training-becomes-more-geopolitical/> [Accessed: 15/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

In December 2022, the Council decided to set an oil price cap for crude oil and petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals which originate in or are exported from Russia, at USD 60 per barrel. The price cap on Russian oil will limit price surges driven by extraordinary market conditions and drastically reduce the revenues Russia has earned from oil after it unleashed its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. It will also serve to stabilise global energy prices while mitigating adverse consequences on energy supply to third countries.

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has also had a direct impact on global food security and affordability. However, the common agricultural policy (CAP) has ensured the Union’s ability to absorb shocks in terms of food security. The EU has also underlined that EU sanctions against Russia allow the free flow of agricultural and food products and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The main issue therefore is affordability with high market prices and inflationary trends resulting from the war in Ukraine.³⁶

Furthermore, in July 2022, a deal was brokered by the UN and Turkey to restart crucial exports out of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Later, though, in October Russia announced that it had walked away from the agreement. Grain exports are one of the few sources of hard-currency income for the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine has been one of the world’s largest exporters of grain, contributing 42 percent of the global share of sunflower oil, 16 percent of maize, and almost 10 percent of wheat. Not only are Ukraine’s exports essential for the stability of world markets, but Ukraine’s grain exports have also contributed greatly to the World Food Program’s humanitarian stocks, shipped regularly to such war-ridden countries as Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Lastly, the agreement indicated Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea region and presented an opportunity to strengthen Ankara’s geopolitical position.³⁷

³⁶ European Council (2022), *Impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the markets: EU response*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/> [Accessed: 28/12/2022]

³⁷ Kusa, I. (2023), *The Ukraine-Russia Grain Deal: A Success or Failure?*, Wilson Center. Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-russia-grain-deal-success-or-failure> [Accessed: 09/01/2023]

Turkish Aggression near the European Geopolitical Borders

Violations of Greek Airspace and Territorial Waters

Türkiye’s disputes over Greek airspace and territorial waters have been taking place since the 1970s and are a serious friction in the bilateral relations between the two countries. The Turkish invasion in Cyprus in July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish occupation of the northern portion of Cyprus, which continues to this day, decisively, also, impacted the relations between the two countries and increased tensions. The repeated Turkish attempts to violate Greece’s sovereignty rights not only in airspace but also on the continental shelf have even brought them close to war (crisis of March 1987, Imia crisis of December 1996 and crisis due to illegal seismic activities on the Greek continental shelf, July-November 2020). Nowadays, tensions are further escalating.

Türkiye is systematically trying to increase the number of disputes by adding new issues such as the **Blue Homeland Doctrine** and **Grey Zones** in the Aegean Sea, the airspace along with the continuously changing Turkish claims that pose a great threat to the security and stability of the Aegean Sea, being the Eastern borderline of the European Union.³⁸

³⁸ *The Blue Homeland Concept and Its Importance*, MaviVatan.net
Available at: <https://mavivatan.net/mavi-vatan-kavrami-ve-onemi/> [Accesses at: 27/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”
Study Guide



Figure 5: Blue Homeland “Mavi Vatan – August 2020 (source: [MaviVatan](#))

Airspace

Greece, as a sovereign state, chose to exercise its sovereignty in the air within the 10 n-m of territorial waters, for the purposes of aviation and the control thereof, and within 6 n-m at sea.³⁹

Although Greece’s 10 n-m airspace is not illegal, it is not clear that it is aligned with International Law since the territorial waters only extend to a 6 n-m distance. Most states respect Greece’s 10 n-m of airspace but Türkiye refuses to recognize these claims and states that Greece does not comply with international practice and predates International Civil Aviation

³⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *National Airspace*
Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/national-airspace.html> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

Organization (ICAO) statutes.⁴⁰⁴¹⁴² Greek claims are aligned with International Law since each sovereign state has the right to extend its territorial airspace and waters up to 12 n-m. What stands out in Greece’s case is that airspace and waters do not coincide.⁴³

A conflict between the two countries ensued on December 19, 2022, **over the Aegean Sea**, with both sides accusing each other of violating international law.⁴⁴

Turkish warplanes and drones, often armed, violate Greek airspace, on a systematic basis, and fly over even inhabited Greek areas, which raises serious security concerns. Such conduct on the part of Türkiye consists of a flagrant violation of Greek airspace and triggers potential incidents and/or conflicts.

Territorial Waters

Greece has never concluded a continental shelf agreement with Türkiye, a dispute that has been pending since the 1970s, and which, according to Greece, is the only legal difference between the two countries.⁴⁵ On the other hand, Türkiye regularly adds to the discussion many other issues, such as, among others, issues of sovereignty over certain islands, the demilitarization status of other islands, the right of Greece to extend its territorial waters up to 12 n-m, etc.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Valius Venckunas (2022), Turkey, Greece clash over the Aegean Sea: here’s what we know so far, Aerotime Hub
Available at: <https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/turkey-greece-clash-over-the-aegean-sea-heres-what-we-know-so-far> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *Issues of Greek – Turkish Relations, Athens FIR*
Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/athens-fir.html> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Türkiye, *Air Space Related Problems*
Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/air-space-related-related-problems.en.mfa> [Accesses at: 28/12/2022]

⁴³ G. Assonitis, *The Greek Airspace: The Legality of a paradox*, The U.S. Air Force Academy, Journal of Legal Studies, 1997-1998 [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *Issues of Greek – Turkish Relations*
Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/> [Accessed at: 27/12/2022]

⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Republic of Türkiye, *Background Note on Aegean Disputes*
Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa> [Accessed at: 27/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

More specifically, in the early 1970s, *Türkiye initiated a systematic policy of contentions and claims against the sovereignty, the sovereign rights and jurisdictions of Greece.*

In the early 1990s, a Turkish theory was developed: the **theory of grey zones**. This theory of reinterpreting international agreements challenges Greek sovereignty over a number of islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean.⁴⁷

Nowadays, Turkish claims have been ever more expanded with the **MoU between Türkiye and Libya** in 2020, followed by the renewed MoU in 2022, the **Blue Homeland Doctrine** and claims that Greek Islands do not have a right to EEZ. According to Greece, these MoUs are considered illegal. These claims have led to numerous disputes in territorial waters and violations of Greece’s sovereignty rights in the Greek Islands and the Aegean Sea.⁴⁸


Greece's right to unilaterally extend its territorial waters up to 12 n-m finds a very solid basis in international law, while a close look at Türkiye claims to the contrary reveals their lack of legal basis. Greece has the right to extend its coastal zone whenever it wishes. Its partial extension, i.e. the extension initially to the Ionian and later to the rest of the Greek territory, is legal and complies with UNCLOS, Chicago Convention and International Law.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *Turkish Claims*
Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims.html> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

EUropa.S. 2023
European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”
 Study Guide



MAP 11 - 2020: Publication of TPAO's applications for hydrocarbon exploration license in the area of the Turkish-Libyan Memorandum

One month later (21.4.2020), TPAO's applications for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licenses, for the entire area claimed by Turkey under the illegal Turkish-Libyan Memorandum and as depicted in the above map, are published in the Turkish Government Gazette. Although no license appears to have been granted so far, a decision of the Turkish Council of Ministers granting license to TPAO may be issued and published at any time.

Figure 5: Turkish Claims in the Aegean Sea – December 2022 (source: MFA.GR)

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Unauthorized Drilling Activities near Cyprus

The Drilling disagreement started in December 2010, when the Greek Cypriot side unilaterally signed the Continental Shelf Agreement with Israel that entered into force on 25 February 2011. The boundary follows an equidistance line from the final point of the Cyprus–Lebanon maritime boundary to the initial point of the Cyprus–Egypt border.



Figure 6: Cyprus-Israel Maritime Boundary Agreement – December 2010 (source: [Sovereign Limits](#))

After the Greek Cypriots announced that they started drilling activities, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister of , and Derviş Eroğlu, the former

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

President of Northern Cyprus signed the Continental Shelf Restriction Agreement on September 21, 2011. Since then, the drilling disagreement has been brought into the agenda along with the Cyprus question.

On June 20, 2019, the European Council adopted conclusions on several issues concerning the European Union, and especially external relations. In **clause 17**, the Council condemned Türkiye’s illegal action in the Eastern Mediterranean (and the Aegean Sea) and expressed its concern about the continuous illegal drillings and activities in the Eastern Mediterranean along with the Turkish unwillingness to respond to European Union’s repetitive calls to cease them.⁵⁰ The clause, also, included an invitation to the Commission and the EEAS to submit appropriate options and targeted measures against Türkiye. The European Council remained seized of the matter and called upon Türkiye to respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus and refrain, underlining the impact of such actions on the EU – Türkiye relations.⁵¹

On July 11, 2019, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed the Secretary-General concerning the drilling activities near Cyprus, violating Cyprus EEZ and continental shelf.⁵² More specifically, the drilling vessel *Yavuz*, approximately 10 n-m south of Karpasia Peninsula, and the drilling vessel *Faith*, accompanied by warships, at a distance of 36 n-m from the western coast of Cyprus.⁵³ In the letter, it is highlighted that both of the drilling vessels belong to a State-owned Turkish Petroleum Company and that Ankara has numerous times rejected the negotiations proposed by Cyprus, in order to facilitate the process of solving these disputes.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, an illegal seismic survey was, also taking

⁵⁰ European Council, *Conclusions – 20 June 2019*

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/20/european-council-conclusions-final-20-june-2019/> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Letter to the Security Council (A/73/944-S/2019/564) (2019), *Turkish Violations*

Available at: <https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/newsroom/2019/07/A-73-944%20%CE%A4%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%81%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AD%CF%82%20%CE%A0%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%B2%CE%B9%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82%2025.7.19.pdf> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

⁵³ Bianet, *Southern Cyprus Issues Arrest Warrant Against Turkey’s Drill ship Faith*

Available at: <https://m.bianet.org/english/print/209215-southern-cyprus-issues-arrest-warrant-against-turkey-s-drill-ship-fatih> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

⁵⁴ Ibid.

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

place by the Turkish vessel *Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa*, on the Block 01, 08 and 12 areas^{55, 56}.




Figure 7: Yavuz, Faith and Brbaros Hoyreddin Paşa – July 11, 2019 (source: [Annex III, letter addressed to the UNSC](#))

On October 14, 2019, the European Council adopted Conclusions concerning Türkiye’s actions posing a threat to EU security. In **clause 9**, the unauthorized drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and precisely Cyprus’ EEZ and the European Council reaffirmed its solidarity with Cyprus.⁵⁷

Following the recent updates in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye’s claims and the review of the already adopted framework for restrictive measures

⁵⁵ Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry – Hydrocarbons Service – Cyprus, *Research Activities* Available at: http://www.meci.gov.cy/meci/hydrocarbon.nsf/page17_en/page17_en?OpenDocument [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ European Council, *Conclusions – 17 October 2019*, Press Release. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/17/european-council-conclusions-on-turkey-illegal-drilling-activities-and-mh17/> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

in response to Türkiye’s unauthorized drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, on November 8, 2022, the Council adopted a new decision extending the regime for one year, **until 12 November 2023**.⁵⁸

The **sanctions regime** against the unauthorized drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean is a direct follow-up to the Council Conclusions of *14 October 2019*, which were endorsed by the European Council on *17-18 October 2019*, when the EU reaffirmed its full solidarity with Cyprus regarding respect for its sovereignty and sovereign rights in accordance with international law, and invited the Commission and the EEAS to submit proposals for a framework for restrictive measures.⁵⁹

The EU, therefore, maintained its ability to impose targeted restrictive measures on persons or entities responsible for or involved in unauthorized drilling activities of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁰

The sanctions consist of a travel ban to the EU and an asset freeze for persons and entities. In addition, EU persons and entities are forbidden from making funds available to those listed.

Türkiye’s Migratory Pressure

In 2015, massive **migratory flows** influxed the European Union⁶¹, through its borders, and precisely the Greek Islands, seeking protection and asylum from the EU member-states. Massive pressure was applied not only to the East European Shores but to the Union as a whole. The emergency became increasingly serious considering that a country like Greece was unable to sustain a high number of people within its reception facilities and deal with the migratory pressure that was applied on its boards.⁶²

⁵⁸ Council of the EU, *The Eastern Mediterranean: Council prolongs the sanctions regime over unauthorizes drilling activities for a further year*, Press Release.

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/08/eastern-mediterranean-council-prolongs-the-sanctions-regime-over-unauthorised-drilling-activities-for-a-further-year/> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Eurostat (March 2016), *Asylum in the EU member-states*

Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6> [Accesses at: 04/01/2023]

⁶² Ianni Aurora, Açığız Meral, Giannotta Valeria (2021), *The Refugee Issues in Turkey's Relations with the EU*

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

The EU took measures attempting to deal with Türkiye’s migratory pressure, yet this policy toward the EU borders was a turning point in EU – Türkiye relations.

On October 15, 2015, the EU adopted the **EU-Türkiye Joint Action Plan** in order to address this crisis together in a spirit of burden-sharing. The Action Plan tried to address the current crisis situation by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, by supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Türkiye and by strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU. The Plan was built on and was consistent with commitments taken by Türkiye and the EU in other contexts such as but not limited to the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue. It is highlighted that all of the actions taken would be implemented simultaneously by both parts of the Action Plan.⁶³

On March 2016, the EU and Türkiye signed a “Statement of Cooperation”, the **EU-Türkiye Deal**, in order for the Union to respond to the unexpected arriving of people from Syria, Afganistan and Iraq on European shores. Firstly, Türkiye would take any measures necessary to stop people travelling irregularly from Turkey to the Greek islands while anyone who arrived on the islands irregularly from Türkiye could be returned there.

Secondly, for every Syrian returned from the islands, EU Member States would accept one Syrian refugee who had waited inside Türkiye. The EU wanted to forge a response to forced migration that was rooted in solidarity and responsibility-sharing to ease the pressure on frontline member states, especially for Greece. Furthermore, the EU wished to ensure a fair, sustainable and humane relocation system that would work for new arrivals and host communities alike.

Available at: https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2021/07/cespi-the_refugee_issue_in_turkeys_relations.pdf [Accessed at: 04/01/2023]

⁶³ European Commission (2015), *EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan*

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860 [Accessed at: 04/01/2023]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

Lastly, Türkiye would receive €6 billion to improve the humanitarian situation faced by refugees in the country, and Turkish nationals would be granted visa-free travel to Europe.⁶⁴

Although Türkiye was cooperative, at first, when the EU tried to manage the unexpected arrival of immigrants crossing the EU borders, it is rather clear that migratory pressure that was applied on the Union had an impact in the relations between the Union and Türkiye. In addition to that, in the years that followed, Türkiye refused to take back Syrians and its involvement in the Syrian conflict is rather unclear and worrying.⁶⁵

EU Reaction towards Türkiye’s Assertive Military and Foreign Policy

Since the gradual shift of Türkiye’s Foreign Policy in the early 2000s, the European Union has adopted frameworks, suggestions and sanctions against the assertive military and illegal actions of Türkiye. Although in the beginning, the EU invested in working towards a more European Türkiye, it is clear that Türkiye is more afar than ever before.⁶⁶

The European Council meeting of June 2022 expressed deep concern about the repeated actions and statements by Türkiye and has recalled its previous conclusions and the statement of March 2021. In the past years, the European Council has repeatably reiterated that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU Member States. It has highlighted the need and urged Türkiye to fully respect international law, de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability and good neighbourly relations in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁷

The European Union’s strategic interest is a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and

⁶⁴ EU Rescue Committee, *What Is the EU- Türkiye Deal?*

Available at: <https://eu.rescue.org/article/what-eu-turkey-deal> [Accessed at:04/01/2023]

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ European Commission, *Key findings of the 2022 Report on Türkiye*

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_22_6088 [Accessed at: 04/01/2023]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye therefore the sanctions posed to Türkiye will remain until further deliberations.⁶⁸

Conclusions

It has been made abundantly clear that Ukraine and Türkiye are following different paths when it comes to European integration. Ukraine on the one hand is highly interested in joining the EU - by sharing common values - and is eager to align with EU acquis. Türkiye, on the other hand, despite having obtained candidate status since 1999, is not showing willingness to achieve progress on its status as a candidate. However, EU cannot undermine Türkiye's geostrategic importance and its pivotal role in corridors such as the Southern Gas Corridor. In overall, the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are issues that ought to shape and reinvigorate the Union's strategic awareness.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Questions Raised

1. Is the concept of EU strategic autonomy viable and effective when facing crises? To what degree can European autonomy be developed considering the EU-NATO relationship?
2. How can the EU legal framework be enhanced in terms of conflict prevention and crisis management?
3. Should a fast-track integration process be adopted for Ukraine?
4. Must the EU sanction regime against Russia be re-evaluated for it to have a greater impact?
5. How can member states better coordinate in providing military and economic aid to Ukraine?
6. What further actions can be taken by member states to tackle the food and energy crises arising from the Russian aggression towards Ukraine?
7. Does the EU have the capacity to act as a mediator in the tensions between Greece and Türkiye?
8. How could the Union develop more concrete measures for responding to states that threaten EU territory (Greece and Cyprus) and integrity?
9. What measures can the EU adopt in order to handle migratory pressure from neighbouring countries?
10. How can the EU address Türkiye's illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean?

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Bibliography

Askew, J. (2022), *Ukraine War: A month-by-month timeline of the conflict in 2022*, Euronews.

Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-europe-russia-war-ukraine-failure/> [Accessed 30/12/2022]

Barros, G. (2023), *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment*, ISW.

Available at: <https://www.understandingwar.org/background/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2023> [Accessed: 02/01/2023]

Bianet, *Southern Cyprus Issues Arrest Warrant Against Turkey's Drill ship Faith*

Available at: <https://m.bianet.org/english/print/209215-southern-cyprus-issues-arrest-warrant-against-turkey-s-drill-ship-fatih> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

Blue Homeland Concept and Its Importance, MaviVatan.net

Available at: <https://mavivatan.net/mavi-vatan-kavrami-ve-onemi/> [Accesses at: 27/12/2022]

Council of the European Union (2018), *Enlargement and stabilization and association process – Council conclusions*

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf> [Accessed at: 23/12/2022]

Council of the EU, *The Eastern Mediterranean: Council prolongs the sanctions regime over unauthorizes drilling activities for a further year*, Press Release.

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/08/eastern-mediterranean-council-prolongs-the-sanctions-regime-over-unauthorised-drilling-activities-for-a-further-year/> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

Council of the EU, *Ukraine: EU launches Military Assistance Mission*, Press Release.

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/15/ukraine-eu-launches-military-assistance-mission/>
[Accessed: 15/12/2022]

Dalay, G. (2021), *Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock*, Brookings.

Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-europe-and-the-eastern-mediterranean-charting-a-way-out-of-the-current-deadlock/>
[Accessed: 25/11/2022]

EEAS (2016), Shared Vision, *Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*.

Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

EU Rescue Committee, *What Is the EU- Türkiye Deal?*

Available at: <https://eu.rescue.org/article/what-eu-turkey-deal> [Accessed at: 04/01/2023]

European Commission (2015), *EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan*

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860 at:
[Accessed at: 04/01/2023]

European Council (2003), *A secure Europe in a better world*.

Available at:
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/> [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

European Council, *Conclusions – 20 June 2019*

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/20/european-council-conclusions-final-20-june-2019/>
[Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

European Council, *Conclusions – 17 October 2019*, Press Release.

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/17/european-council-conclusions-on-turkey-illegal-drilling-activities-and-mh17/> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

European Council, *EU Enlargement Policy-Ukraine*.
Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/>
[Accessed: 20/11/2022]

European Council, *EU Sanctions against Russia explained*.
Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/>
[Accessed: 25/12/2022]

European Council (2022), *Impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the markets: EU response*.
Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/> [Accessed: 28/12/2022]

Eurostat (March 2016), *Asylum in the EU member-states*
Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6> [Accesses at: 04/01/2023]

G. Assonitis, *The Greek Airspace: The Legality of a paradox*, The U.S. Air Force Academy, Journal of Legal Studies, 1997-1998 [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

Haltiwagner, J., Rojas, W. & Snodgrass. E. (2022), *Ukrainian President Zelenskyy delivered historic speech to Congress at a crucial moment in Ukraine war: 'Ukraine is alive'*, Business Insider.
Available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/zelenskyy-gives-historic-speech-to-joint-session-of-congress-2022-12>

Ianni Aurora, Açıkgöz Meral, Giannotta Valeria (2021), *The Refugee Issues in Turkey's Relations with the EU*

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Available at:

https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2021/07/cespi-the_refugee_issue_in_turkeys_relations.pdf [Accessed at: 04/01/2023]

Josep Borrell (2022), *Putin’s War has given birth to Geopolitical Europe*, Project Syndicate.

Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/geopolitical-europe-responds-to-russias-war-by-josep-borrell-2022-03> [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

Kusa, I. (2023), *The Ukraine-Russia Grain Deal: A Success or Failure?*, Wilson Center.

Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-russia-grain-deal-success-or-failure> [Accessed: 09/01/2023]

Letter to the Security Council (A/73/944-S/2019/564) (2019), *Turkish Violations*

Available at: <https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/newsroom/2019/07/A-73-944%20%CE%A4%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%81%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AD%CF%82%20%CE%A0%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%B2%CE%B9%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82%2025.7.19.pdf> [Accessed at: 03/01/2023]

Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry – Hydrocarbons Service – Cyprus, *Research Activities*

Available at: http://www.meci.gov.cy/meci/hydrocarbon.nsf/page17_en/page17_en?OpenDocument [Accessed at:03/01/2023]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *Issues of Greek – Turkish Relations*

Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/> [Accessed at: 27/12/2022]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *National Airspace*

Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/national-airspace.html> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *Issues of Greek – Turkish Relations, Athens FIR*

Available at:

<https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/athens-fir.html> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Hellenic Republic, *Turkish Claims*

Available at:

<https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims.html> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Türkiye, *Air Space Related Problems*

Available at:

<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/air-space-related-related-problems.en.mfa>
[Accesses at: 28/12/2022]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Republic of Türkiye, *Background Note on Aegean Disputes*

Available at:

<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa>
[Accessed at: 27/12/2022]

New York Times, *Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.*

Available at:

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html> [Accessed 15/12/2022]

Portela, C. & Kluge, J. (2022), *Slow-Acting Tools: Evaluating EU sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine*, EUISS.

Available at:

https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_11_Sanctions_0.pdf [Accessed: 30/11/2022]

Speck, U. (2022), *Putin unchained: Europe must turn Russia’s war against Ukraine into a failure*, Politico.eu.

Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-europe-russia-war-ukraine-failure/> [Accessed: 10/11/2022]

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**

Study Guide

Tidey, A. (2022), *Deadly Poland blast 'likely caused' by Ukrainian air defence system*, NATO chief says, Euronews.

Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/11/16/nato-chief-holds-emergency-meeting-over-poland-explosion> [Accessed: 05/12/2022]

Valius Venckunas (2022), *Turkey, Greece clash over the Aegean Sea: here's what we know so far*, Aerotime Hub

Available at: <https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/turkey-greece-clash-over-the-aegean-sea-heres-what-we-know-so-far> [Accessed at: 28/12/2022]

Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, *Within the new Ukraine Mission, EU Military Training Becomes More Geopolitical*.

Available at: <https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/with-the-new-ukraine-mission-eu-military-training-becomes-more-geopolitical/> [Accessed: 15/12/2022]

Further Reading

Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D. & Tsakonas, P. (2019), *Eksoterikes Sxeseis tis EE* (Foreign Relations of the EU), I. Sideris Publications, Athens

Koppa, M. (2017), *I Kini Politiki Amynas ke Asfalias* (Common Security and Defence Policy), Patakis Publications, Athens

Taran, S. (2022), *Strengthening the impact of EU sanctions against Russian aggression in Ukraine*, European Policy Centre.

Available at: https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/Strengthening_the_impact_of_EU_sanctions_DP.pdf [Accessed: 25/11/2022]

Useful Links

European Commission, Key Findings on of the 2022 Report on Türkiye.
Available here:

EUropa.S. 2023
**European Council, “Reviving the idea of European Strategic Autonomy
under the Russian Invasion in Ukraine and the Turkish Aggression in the
European Geopolitical Border”**
Study Guide

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_22_6088
[Accessed: 28/12/2022]

European Council, *How the European Council Works*. Available at:
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/how-the-european-council-works/> [Accessed: 20/11/2022]

European Council (2022), *A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade*.

Available here:

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/> [Accessed: 24/11/2022]

European Council, *EU Restrictive Measures against Russia over Ukraine*.

Available here:

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/> [Accessed: 25/12/2022]